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We explore how the vertical structure of direct democracy in a federal context aﬀects
expenditure decisions of sub-central governments. In so doing we revisit previous research
on the eﬀect of direct democratic institution on public policies. Particularly, the eﬀect of
upper-level (state) existence of direct democratic control on local expenditure. Empirically
we exploit the fact that both states (cantons) and local governments (municipalities) en-
joy a high autonomy in setting their degree of direct democracy. This allows us to take
into account vertical diﬀerences between institutions, i.e. we can distinguish the eﬀect of
state direct democracy on local expenditures for municipalities with and without own direct
democratic instruments. Considering 119 municipalities belonging to 22 Swiss cantons for
the period 1993-2007 we highlight that municipalities without ﬁscal referenda belonging to
cantons with ﬁscal referenda present higher expenditure, while the eﬀect is much reduced
and statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for municipalities that also avail of referenda.
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1 Introduction
How can one tame the Leviathan, i.e. politicians expansionary impact on public expenditure
beyond what is desired by citizens? The answer appears to be: direct democracy. A vast
array of empirical studies have shown a deﬂationary impact of direct democratic institutions on
public expenditures.1 All of these studies use countries with a federal setting as data sources.
Prominently on the list are the U.S.A. and Switzerland. Interestingly however, prior research
ignores, fully or partially, the federal setting. In other words, earlier research considers the
eﬀect on expenditure of a speciﬁc level of government through the existence of direct democratic
institutions of this same level of government, or the impact of upper level democratic institutions
on lower level expenditures.2 The full federal structure and the resulting potential vertical
interdependence are never considered.
In this paper we want to go one step further and take into consideration the vertical structure
and the resulting potential interdependence inherent in a federation. That is, we analyze the
impact of direct democratic institutions on public expenditure at the local level taking into
account both the institutional setting at the local and upper level of government. Speciﬁcally,
we are interested whether the impact of direct democracy at the upper level of government
depends on the degree of citizen participation at the local level.
We also see our paper as a complement and extension of the results of some previous
research. Feld and Kirchgässner (2001b) ﬁnd that municipal ﬁscal referenda reduce municipal
public expenditure. Similarly, Feld and Matsusaka (2003) show that this result also holds when
looking at the cantonal level. Funk and Gathmann (2011) also ﬁnd that cantonal ﬁscal referenda
have a negative eﬀect on cantonal expenditure, but they do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant impact on
municipal expenditures. This last result is in contrast with Matsusaka (1995)’s previous ﬁndings
suggesting a positive eﬀect of upper level government on local level expenditure.
We use a newly assembled dataset on Switzerland. It comprises information on public
expenditure and institutions for the 119 largest municipalities from 22 of the 26 cantons (states)
over the period 1993 to 2007. Switzerland is an ideal empirical background for our focus of
research. First, it is a very decentralized country leaving large spending autonomy to both levels
of sub-federal jurisdictions. The three levels of the Swiss federation, federal, cantonal (state)
and municipal, hold roughly equal shares of public spending, similarly for revenues. Second,
all states and most municipalities have the autonomy to deﬁne the degree of direct democratic
participation in ﬁscal matters implying an important variation in institutional settings within
1Among the others Feld and Matsusaka (2003), Feld and Kirchgässner (2001b), Funk and Gathmann (2011)
and Matsusaka (1995).
2For example, how referendum in Swiss cantons aﬀect cantonal public expenditure as in Feld and Matsusaka
(2003) or how initiative in U.S.A. state aﬀect local expenditure as in Matsusaka (1995).
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our dataset. We concentrate on one particular instrument of direct democracy: the mandatory
ﬁscal referendum.
We ﬁnd that taking the vertical interdependence of direct democratic institutions into ac-
count is important. Our data suggest that cantonal ﬁscal referenda increases municipal public
expenditure for localities that do not avail of a referendum, while this expansionary eﬀect is
much reduced for municipalities that also have a ﬁscal referendum.
2 Theoretical Background
There is a continuing and growing interest in exploring the eﬀect of institutions on economic
outcomes. The ﬁelds of application are vast and varied. 3 One aspect that receives particu-
lar attention is the discussion on understanding and testing diﬀerences in the policy outcome
between representative and direct democratic systems. In both systems the citizen delegates
power to politicians through elections. While in a representative system the citizen is involved
only during elections, in a direct democratic system some political decisions need citizen ap-
proval. These two systems should entail the same policy outcome if the median voter theorem
holds (Downs, 1957). Nevertheless, representatives’ decisions can deviate from citizens’ prefer-
ences either because politicians seek to maximize their own utility function (Tullock, 1980), or
because, despite being welfare maximizers, they are not able to fully apprehend constituents’
preferences (Matsusaka, 1992).
Kessler (2005) sets up a model based on the median voter focusing on the asymmetry of
information between citizens and politicians. In direct democratic legislation the citizen does
not invest in information acquisition because her vote is unlikely to be determinant. In contrast,
under representative democracy, the politician ﬁnds it proﬁtable to be informed because she
has discretionary power. Elected representatives allow the promotion of more eﬃcient policies,
even though in a popular vote these policies would be closest to the preferences of a majority.
Gerber (1996) argues that direct democracy is an instrument that reduces the gap between
citizen preferences and politician behavior. She considers a spatial model in which the gov-
ernment choses the point which maximize its utility. When initiatives can be proposed by an
interest group, the government choses a point which is closer to the one preferred by the median
voter. Instead, when there is no threat of the initiative, the government will chose its preferred
policy.
Direct democracy can assume two main forms: the referendum and the popular initiative.
3For example: Acemoglu et al. (2001) highlight the relevance of inherited institution from colonial countries as
determinant on income per capita; Aghion et al. (2004) dealing speciﬁcally with the eﬀect of political institutions
ﬁnd that democracy positively aﬀect growth.
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The main diﬀerence between the two is the time in which citizens become part of the legislative
process. With referendum citizens are called at the end of the process.
Romer and Rosenthal (1979) explore the agenda-setter model considering a situation with
referendum on expenditure. Referendum gives veto power to citizens on representatives’ deci-
sions. The central ﬁnding is that government expenditures are usually higher than the ones
wished by the median voter and never lower. The gap between median voter’s preferences and
policy outcome is reduced, but policy makers still have the main role in policy formation.
Feld and Kirchgässner (2000) describe how the referendum, contrary to what is suggested
by Kessler (2005), can positively aﬀect citizens’ information and then political action. Given
that in direct democracy voters can decide for themselves, they have an incentive in gathering
more information on the issue on the ballot. It also reduces the ability of politicians to pursue
their personal goals. Thanks to referendum politicians work is under scrutiny, because citizens
are better informed about it.
In the case of popular initiatives citizens’ intervention is at the beginning of the legislative
process. According to Vatter (2000) it is the most powerful instrument of direct democracy.
He investigates the diﬀerences between initiative and referendum. He highlights that while
referendum needs a ﬁrst approval by representatives, initiative enables a minority of citizens to
impose a popular vote which can go against representative majority.
Other theoretical contributions give insights on how direct and representative democracy
diﬀerently aﬀect the vertical structure of public good provision.
Redoano and Scharf (2004) show that representative democracy sustains centralization even
when direct democracy would not be able to support it, because regional policy preferences are
too diﬀerent. This result is based on a model of two heterogeneous jurisdictions with policy
spillovers in which strategic delegation plays a crucial role. Centralization is more likely to occur
when the decisions are taken via representative rather than direct democracy. Schnellenbach et
al. (2010), reach to the same conclusion by using a diﬀerent theoretical model.
In essence, most of the theoretical results point to the fact that direct democratic participa-
tion of the citizen in the decision making process brings adopted policies closer to the preferences
of voters. Further, since politicians have a tendency to increase public expenditure beyond what
is socially optimal implies that direct democracy has a reducing eﬀect on expenditure.
But what about a federal setting? What if two levels of government choose the degree
of direct democratic participation in public good provision? And what about the vertical
interdependence resulting from this.
There is relatively little theoretical work that has explored the vertical interaction among
direct democratic institutions. A full theoretical model that identiﬁes the channels that are at
work is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, given the direct eﬀect described above it
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is intuitive that the possible combinations of institutional setting might matter and therefore
should be accounted for.
For example, consider a federation with two levels of government, say state and local, each
with the possibility to allow for direct democratic participation of its citizens. This gives raise
to four diﬀerent cases as illustrated in Table 1. Previous theoretical and empirical studies have
only considered cases (a) and (b) and might have introduced bias in their estimates.
When both levels have a referendum then we should observe the lowest level of expenditure
for the local government, ceteris paribus, since both tiers have the constraint given by citizens’
control. If the lower level does not have a referendum and the state does, then one can think
of two opposite eﬀects that are at work. On the one hand, citizen control at the upper level of
government could allow unconstrained local authorities to extract more rents, which implies a
higher local expenditure. On the other hand, local expenditure could be reduced through the
possibility of vertical yardstick competition, i.e. citizens can observe the “good” behavior of
state authorities and hold local politicians in check, reducing the agency problem.
If vertical interaction matters then, to understand the full eﬀect of direct democracy, one
should control for all the tiers of government involved in the spending process. Thus, what we
do is to test whether the existence of ﬁscal referendum in the state (upper level) aﬀects local
expenditure decisions and whether this eﬀect varies with local direct democratic participation.
This is the theoretical hypothesis we aim to test empirically in this paper.
3 Empirical Background
Pommerehne (1978) was among the ﬁrst to highlight the negative eﬀect of direct democracy
on public expenditure. He used data on Swiss municipalities in the year 1970 to show that
the availability of a referendum in a municipality reduces (excess) public service provision. He
interprets the results as highlighting that in jurisdictions where decisions are taken directly
by voters the policy outcome is closest to the median voter. Hence, agency cost seems to be
reduced by citizen intervention.
Matsusaka (1995), using annual data for the period 1960-1990 on U.S. states, uncovers
again a negative impact of citizen participation on expenditure. States with statutory initiative
have a signiﬁcantly lower level of expenditure compared to the states that do not. Further, he
looks at the eﬀect of upper level direct democracy on lower level expenditure, ﬁnding that local
expenditure is higher in initiative states. To our knowledge this is the ﬁrst attempt to, at least
partially, address the vertical interdependence of democratic institutions.
Feld and Kirchgässner (2001a,b) study in detail the outcome of several forms of direct
democracy on public policy. Using data on 131 Swiss municipalities in the year 1990 they show
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that mandatory referendum on budget deﬁcits entails a reduction in public debt, expenditure
and revenue. Moreover, using data on 26 Swiss cantons for the period 1986-1997 they ﬁnd that
expenditure and revenue are lower in cantons with a mandatory referendum on new spending
projects. They also test the eﬀect of signature requirements for initiatives, i.e. the percentage
of the population required to bring an initiative to a ballot, on expenditure, revenue, debt
and deﬁcit. They ﬁnd mixed results. The signature requirement in cantons with referendum
increases spending while in canton without referendum it reduces spending and revenue.
Feld and Matsusaka (2003) have another look at Swiss cantonal institutions, this time using
data for the period 1980-1998. They consider three variables representing direct democratic in-
stitutions: the presence of a mandatory ﬁscal referendum, the spending threshold that triggers
a referendum and the initiative signature requirement. They ﬁnd a rather important nega-
tive eﬀect of referendum. Speciﬁcally, cantons with referendum have 19% lower expenditures
compared to cantons without referendum. Feld et al. (2008), using the same dataset, test the hy-
pothesis that decentralization is more likely under direct rather than representative democracy.
They consider centralization of expenditure, revenue and tax revenue as dependent variables.
They conﬁrm, in line with theory, the hypothesis that direct democracy fosters decentralization.
In a more recent contribution, Funk and Gathmann (2011) revisit the previous empiri-
cal ﬁndings of the direct democratic eﬀect, again focusing on the Swiss case. They gather
information on cantonal institutions for the period 1890-2000. The dependent variables are,
alternatively, cantonal expenditure, local expenditure and decentralization. The main indepen-
dent variables are a dummy for the mandatory budget referendum and the initiative signature
requirement. They ﬁnd, in line with theory and the other empirical studies, that referendum
reduce expenditure while the signature requirement increases it. Conversely, they highlight
that direct democracy does not aﬀect the vertical structure of government, i.e. upper level
institutions do not aﬀect lower level expenditure and decentralization, contrary to the ﬁndings
of Matsusaka (1995) and Feld et al. (2008). They suggest that these results are mainly due to
the empirical method. Indeed, Funk and Gathmann (2011), thanks to a long time period, can
control for unobserved heterogeneity among jurisdictions using cantonal ﬁxed eﬀects.
As mentioned before, none of the studies above considers the full array of institutional
settings that can occur in a federation, which is the main contribution of our paper.
Vertical interaction have also been studies within the tax competition literature.
Besley and Rosen (1998) were among the ﬁrst that empirically estimated the presence of
vertical tax externalities. They analyze tax competition between state and federal government
in U.S.A.. They show that changes in excise taxes decided by federal government on goods
such as gasoline and cigarettes aﬀect positively the corresponding state taxes.
Brulhart and Jametti (2006) investigate the presence of horizontal and vertical tax external-
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ities that arise in the context of overlapping tax bases across levels of government in a federal
system. Using a panel data set of Swiss cantons and municipalities, they ﬁnd that vertical
externalities can outweigh horizontal ones.
4 Swiss institutional setting
Switzerland is often praised as a natural laboratory to test theoretical predictions within ﬁscal
federalism.4
The country has three levels of government: federal, cantonal and municipal, each with
wide ranging autonomy both in expenditure and revenue decisions. For example, during the
period 1990-2009 the expenditure (revenue) shares averaged 32% (31%) for federal, 41% (41%)
for cantonal and 27% (28%) for local administrations. These shares are quite stable over time.
At the sub-central level each cantonal constitution deﬁnes the basic framework for public
service provision. Indeed, some services are solely provided by one level of government (cantonal
or municipal), while for a considerable range of public goods there is expenditure sharing by both
levels of government.5 Finally, localities provide some services based on a cantonal mandate.
Table 2 presents the contribution, by each level of government, for a disaggregated range of
public services.
Municipalities also have large autonomy in setting tax rates within their respective cantonal
constitutions. It should be noted that, contrary to many other federations, both sub-central
levels of government essentially share the same tax bases, i.e. municipalities’ main source of
revenues are taxes on personal and corporate income and wealth.
Similarly, all three levels of government have an array of direct democratic instruments at
hand in their respective decision making process. Also, in this case there is heterogeneity among
cantons and municipalities (see Figure 1). Actually in many small municipalities the citizens’
assembly is still the prominent decision making instrument. For large municipalities he two main
instruments are the popular initiative and the referendum. We concentrate on the existence
of ﬁscal referenda within a jurisdiction. These can be mandatory or optional. The optional
referendum is generally triggered by the collection of a certain number of signatures in a given
interval of time, while with the mandatory referendum authorities must hold a referendum to
conﬁrm their decision. In Table 3 we show the use of these direct democratic instruments by
level of government. The municipal data we report are from Micotti and Bützer (2003) who
accounts for 91 municipalities for the period 1990-2000. We see that mandatory referendum is,
by far, the most used in the two sub federal jurisdictions.
4Among others: Kirchgassner and Pommerehne (1996), Brulhart and Jametti (2006) and Brülhart et al.
(2012)
5Indeed, for many public service categories all three levels of government are involved to varying degrees.
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Thus, Switzerland presents an ideal setting to empirically test our hypothesis, with impor-
tant autonomy at all levels of government in expenditure decisions well as in the institutional
framework. All this in an otherwise fairly homogeneous setting.
5 Data and empirical model
5.1 Data
To test our hypothesis we assembled a database including annual observations of 119 of the
largest municipalities belonging to 22 Swiss cantons over the period 1993 to 2007. Table 4
presents summary statistics of the data and Appendix Table A.1 gives the deﬁnition and source
of each variable.
We use as dependent variable the net municipal expenditure per capita. This value is net
of transfers that are received from other jurisdictions.6
We obtained information on cantonal direct democratic institutions from Fischer (2009).
We consider whether the canton has a mandatory ﬁscal referendum for new spending projects
or not. Some cantons changed their legislation in the period covered by our data, but this
variation is very small. In 1995, 17 cantons over 26 had mandatory ﬁscal referendum. In 2007
the number of these cantons decreased to 16. In total 5 cantons changed at least once.7
The municipal institutional setting is taken from a new database at the local level by Bützer
(2007).8 We again consider whether a municipality has a mandatory ﬁscal referendum for new
spending projects or not. About 65% of the municipalities in our sample have a mandatory
referendum of this kind.
This institution at municipal level is almost invariant over time for the period considered
in Bützer (2007). The only change is in the municipality of Volkestwil in 2002 which adopted
a ﬁscal mandatory referendum. The other changes that occurred concern the thresholds that
trigger mandatory referendum. Importantly, there have been no changes at the municipal level
following any of the chances in cantonal legislation. Although the number of municipalities
considered is not large, our sample allows us to consider all possible institutional interactions,
which is displayed in the last row of Table 1. During the period covered in our analysis 27%
of the municipalities are without referendum in cantons without referendum, while 8% are
municipalities without referendum in cantons with. Municipalities with referendum that belong
6See Buettner and Wildasin (2006) for details on how municipal ﬁscal budget is aﬀected by intergovernmental
transfers.
7Funk and Gathmann (2011) presents details of the variation for the period 1890-2000.
8Feld et al. (2011) use our same data source to revisit the analysis done by Feld and Kirchgässner (2001a).
We extend Bützer’s (2007) dataset by gathering information for a few additional municipalities.
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to cantons without referendum are 29% of the total, while 36% of the municipalities with
referendum are in cantons also with referendum.
We supplement the institutional information with an array of control variables covering
socio-economic and political characteristics. Speciﬁcally, we control for population to consider
possible economies of scale in the provision of public goods. We use population age shares for
old and young (share pop > 64 and share pop < 20 ), to consider possible diﬀerences in the
demand of public goods. The share of foreigners is included for the same reason. Municipal
area proxies higher costs in provision of public services as area is closely related to municipal
topography. Unemployment controls both for the economic environment as well as the eﬀect
on social security. The presence of a university in a municipality should aﬀect positively the
level of expenditure either because of direct funding or because of related facilities. We also
control for municipalities that are urban centers, to consider the possible higher demand for
public goods for central places. Given that data on income are not available by municipality we
use the amount of federal tax on income paid per capita. Again with this variable we control
for the demand of public goods and use it as a proxy for tax revenues (see below).
Further, we control for political variables. The number of ministers and the number of
parties in the executive should be positively related with our dependent variable because of
the common pool problem (Roubini and Sachs, 1989). The share of left-wing ministers in the
executive is usually used as proxy for citizens’ preferences. Left-wing parties should be more in
favor of government intervention implying a higher level of expenditure.
5.2 Empirical model
The model that we estimate is:
Yict = β1MunRefi + β2CanRefct + β3MunRefi ∗ CanRefct + β4Xict + tt + ict (1)
where i denotes the municipality, c the canton and t the year. The dependent variable Y is the
log of municipal expenditure per capita. Xict are other control variables including the political
and cantonal ones, while tt are year ﬁxed eﬀects. ict is the error term.
5.2.1 Interaction model
To deal with a conditional hypothesis, as the one that we want to test, a proper empirical
method to use is the multiplicative interaction model. By multiplying two terms we implicitly
assume that the eﬀect of a speciﬁc variable depends also on the value of the other variable.
This is exactly what we want, discriminate the cantonal referendum eﬀect on expenditure for
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municipality with and without and referendum. Coeﬃcients estimated do not have anymore
the usual meaning and conﬁdence intervals need to be computed to asses the signiﬁcance of
constitutive variables.9
We start by estimating the model in Equation (1) without considering institutional inter-
action, mainly for comparison to prior studies. We then proceed to add the interaction term to
test our main hypothesis.
5.2.2 Error speciﬁcation
We use as baseline standard errors clustered by cantons, since errors of municipalities within
the same cantons might be correlated. As the number of clusters is less than 42 ,(Angrist and
Pischke, 2009) these standard errors should be taken with some caution. Thus, for completeness
we calculate also standard errors based on the wild bootstrap method (Miller et al., 2008).
Further, given the panel structure of our dataset, serial correlation on the expenditure could
arise. Thus, we make a robustness check by clustering the error at municipal level.
Finally, given that our observations are geographical units we control for spatial correlation
among municipalities.
5.2.3 Cantonal heterogeneity
Funk and Gathmann (2011) ﬁnd that cantonal unobserved heterogeneity aﬀects in an important
way the impact of direct democratic institutions on public expenditure. Using canton ﬁxed
eﬀects they ﬁnd that referendum at cantonal level reduces the level of expenditure at the same
level, which is consistent with previous ﬁnding (Feld and Matsusaka, 2003), but does not eﬀect
at all expenditure at lower level nor on the level of decentralization, which is in contrast with
previous ﬁndings (Feld et al., 2008; Matsusaka, 1995).
Ideally, our estimation of Equation 1 would also include canton ﬁxed eﬀects. However, as
mentioned above the institutional variability at the cantonal level is very small. As such, the
eﬀect of a mandatory cantonal referendum would only be identiﬁed by those municipalities
which belong to cantons with changes in the year of the change. In our case this would be only
43 observations over a sample of 1785. We thus report results using cantonal ﬁxed eﬀects as a
further robustness check to our baseline results.
However, accounting for cantonal heterogeneity is important. Therefore we control, as an
alternative to ﬁxed eﬀects, for observable cantonal diﬀerences. We include a dummy variable
for Latin language cantons to control for cultural diﬀerences across regions. Further, we control
for political preferences using the share of seats of left wings party in the cantonal parliament.
9Given that we consider a dependent variable which is in log form, the coeﬃcient represents the percentage
change in the dependent variable given by an increase of one unit in the value of the independent variable.
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To take into account the demand side we include cantonal population and the dependence ratio.
In addition, we use a dummy variable for the canton of Basel-City. This is due to its particular
status of being both canton and municipality.10
Finally, we use random eﬀects estimation. With random eﬀects we assume that cantonal
eﬀects are not ﬁxed but have a distribution, assuming that the error component is not correlated
with the independent variables. Given the structure of the dataset we use an unbalanced nested
error component model. Our dataset is the classical example of a hierarchical and unbalanced
panel. It is hierarchical because municipalities are grouped by canton and unbalanced because
in each cantons considered there is a diﬀerent number of municipalities. In a situation like this
one might consider the error term as composed by three elements. In panel analysis we assume
it = μi + νit, instead, in a two way error component model, in which data present nested
grouping, the error could be viewed as ict = μi + νic + uict where μi ∼ (0, σ2μ), νic ∼ (0, σ2ν)
and uict ∼ (0, σ2u). By computing the error in this way we can control for unobserved cantonal
and municipal eﬀects (Baltagi et al., 2001).
5.2.4 Income
Certainly income is an important determinant of the level of public expenditures. However, via
the government budget constraint there is a direct link between income, essentially deﬁning tax
revenues, and public expenditures. Income and expenditure are, thus, jointly determined. This
problem is aggravated for the case of Switzerland via the particularity that local authorities
directly tax income.
To deal with this issue, as a robustness check, we instrument income. To do so we should use
as instruments municipal features that are related with income but not with public expenditure.
The instruments we use are the municipal area that is dedicated to recreational activity and
the area dedicated to industrial activity. We might think that people with high income prefer
to live in municipalities in which area dedicated to recreation is prominent rather than in places
with a large area dedicated to productive activity.
6 Results
6.1 Main results
In Table 5 we show the results of our analysis which does not consider the interaction term.
Direct democracy eﬀect on expenditure seems to be coherent with some of the previous ﬁndings
and in contrast with others.
10To be precise, besides Basel there are two other, much smaller, municipalities in the canton of Basel-City.
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In contrast to the results of the cross-sectional analysis by Feld and Kirchgässner (2001b)
we ﬁnd that direct democratic institution at municipal level has no direct eﬀect on expenditure.
By looking at the ﬁrst three columns of Table 5 we highlight that this is true when we control
for socio-economic and also political variables. Extending previous analysis, we use pooled time
series cross-section data and we also consider cantonal controls. This two improvements make
our results more robust. On the one hand, thanks to time series cross-section structure we add
more informative data positively aﬀecting the eﬃciency of the estimation. On the other hand
the cantonal controls go in the direction already developed by Funk and Gathmann (2011) to
consider cantonal heterogeneity.
In the last three columns of Table 5 we show that cantonal referendum aﬀects positively
the municipal expenditure. This is coherent with the ﬁnding of Matsusaka (1995) but in con-
trast with Funk and Gathmann (2011). Municipalities that belong to cantons with mandatory
referendum presents an expenditure level that is almost 18% higher than the ones belonging to
cantons without referendum.
Almost all the control variables are coherent with our expectations. The ones that are
always signiﬁcant are the share of young population, the municipal area and the federal tax
income. Young population negatively aﬀect municipal expenditure, while municipal area and
income have a positive eﬀect.
In Table 6 we present our main results including the interaction term. As already remarked,
coeﬃcients in an interaction model do not have the usual meaning. Then, conﬁdence interval
to consider is not always the one calculated by the standard error in table. Thus, we show also
tests for joint signiﬁcance of the parameters of interest.
Municipal referendum has a positive sign but is not signiﬁcant in any of the speciﬁcations.
Cantonal referendum is always signiﬁcant at the 1% level with a positive sign. These results
are in line with the ones provided without considering the interaction term.
To conﬁrm our hypothesis we should check the signiﬁcance level of the interaction term. We
see that is not signiﬁcant in column (1), when neither socio-economical nor political controls are
used. By adding the socio-economical controls the interaction term becomes signiﬁcant at the
10% level as reported in column (2). With the complete speciﬁcation including also political
controls, column (3), the interaction term becomes signiﬁcant at the 5% level.11 The sign is
always negative. Municipal referendum seems to reduce the positive eﬀect on expenditure from
cantonal referendum. More in detail, considering the last column of Table 6, if the municipality
does not have a referendum this eﬀect is stronger (0.299) than the case in which municipality
have the referendum (0.299-0.174=0.046). The F-statistic to test for joint signiﬁcance of the
11Using wild-bootstrap method to correct for few clusters we ﬁnd the following p-values: 0.819 for the municipal
referendum, 0.007 for the cantonal referendum and 0.105 for the interaction term.
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coeﬃcients Mandatory ref. (can) and Mandatory ref. (can)*(mun) is signiﬁcant at the 99%
conﬁdence level.
Our data thus conﬁrms our hypothesis that cantonal referendum aﬀects municipal policies
depending on whether it also has a referendum or not. Following our intuition, it seems that
if citizens control is at just one level of government, then the other level of government, if it is
free to choose, spends more. These higher expenditures from a political economy point of view
could represent rent seeking of politicians.12 Then, to tame the leviathans in a federation it is
not enough to tighten the control of citizens at just one level of government. The only way to
reduce it, seems to be by extending direct democratic instrument to both levels of government.
6.2 Robustness checks
6.2.1 Error speciﬁcation and cantonal heterogeneity
In Table 7 we show our main results after subjecting the baseline regression in column (3) of
Table 6 to diﬀerent robustness checks.
First, we deal with possible issues related with the error. In column (1) of Table 7 we cluster
at municipal level. By doing so we deal with possible serial correlation given by the structure of
our dataset. As in Table 6 municipal referendum is not signiﬁcant while the cantonal is. Also
the interaction term is still signiﬁcant at the 5% level, again conﬁrming our hypothesis.
In column (2) we take into account spatial correlation that could be present since the
observations represent geographical units. We show results that consider as neighborhood all
municipalities that are within a distance of 15 km. The interaction term now turns out to be
signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Secondly, we deal with possible bias related with cantonal unobserved heterogeneity. In
column (3) we use a random eﬀect estimation with an unbalanced nested error component
model. Again, only cantonal referendum and the interaction term are signiﬁcant. The eﬀect
of cantonal referendum on local expenditure is now (0.109) if the municipality does not have a
referendum, and (0.109-0.103=0.006) in the case in which the municipality has the referendum.
According to this set of results cantonal eﬀect on local expenditure is erased by the presence of
referendum also at the municipal level.
Finally, for completeness we report the results by using cantonal ﬁxed eﬀects. As already
mentioned, ﬁxed eﬀects are in this case mainly biased because of the few institutional changes.
The results are reported in column (4) of Table 7. The variables of interest still present the
signs that we previously found. In this case the interaction term is not signiﬁcant. Cantonal
referendum is now signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
12One might think also that upper level government, because of the constraint given by referendum, shift
competences to lower level implying an increase in expenditure.
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6.2.2 Instrumental variable
In Table 8 we report a further robustness check trying to solve the endogeneity problem given
by the joint determination of income and public expenditure.
For completeness we report ﬁrst stage regressions in Appendix Table A.2.
In column (1) we apply 2sls to our baseline estimation. The instruments pass the weak
instrument tests and the Sargan statistic test for over-identiﬁcation. Although not signiﬁcant,
municipal referendum has a negative impact on local expenditure while cantonal referendum
has a positive eﬀect and is signiﬁcant. Interaction term is also signiﬁcant at the 10% level and
negatively related with local public expenditure.
We report in column (2) the results when we use ﬁxed eﬀects even though we are aware
that the instruments do not work ﬁne in this case.
To be able to use an IV strategy considering also spatial correlation we use the spatial GMM
estimator as proposed by Conley (1999) and show the results in column (3). Our results are
again conﬁrmed. Municipal referendum has no eﬀect on local expenditure while cantonal one a
has positive eﬀect and it is also signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The interaction term has signiﬁcant
negative sign.
Overall, all our robustness checks conﬁrm the main results.
7 Conclusion
We revisit previous empirical ﬁndings on the relationship between public expenditure and deci-
sion making process. We deal speciﬁcally with diﬀerent policy outcomes due to representative
versus direct democratic legislation. We test for the eﬀect of upper level referendum on public
expenditure at lower level jurisdictions in a federal context.
Using the particular features of Swiss institutional setting we discriminate these results for
lower level decision making process. We verify that municipalities spend more in cantons with
referendum. Moreover, this expansive eﬀect varies between municipalities with and without
referendum. Municipalities with referendum ﬁnd reduces this positive eﬀect driven by the
cantonal institution.
Vertical interaction of diﬀerent decision making process seems to matter in the deﬁnition
of public policies. Thus, to account for the real eﬀect of direct democracy in a federal setting,
one should consider all the tiers of government that are involved in policies deﬁnition. Having
direct democratic institution at just one level of government it is not enough to tame the
leviathan. What appear is that if just one of the two levels of government has no constraint it
will spend more. The global impact of direct democracy on expenditure is actually lower than
what suggested in previous research. The hypothesis of a good eﬀect due to vertical yardstick
14
competition it is not conﬁrmed in our analysis.
To really tame the leviathan all the levels of government involved in the public good provision
should present some degree of direct democracy such that no vertical eﬀect arise.
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Table 1: Interactions possibilities
(a) (b)
Jurisdiction (1) (2) (3) (4)
Cantonal No Ref. No Ref. Ref. Ref.
Municipal No Ref. Ref. No Ref. Ref.
Variability 27% 29% 8% 36%
19
Table 2: Destination of public expenditure by level of government in percentage, 2009
State Cantons Municipalities Total
Administration 57% 23% 20% 100%
Defense 91% 4% 5% 100%
Security 10% 64% 26% 100%
Economy 41% 38% 21% 100%
Environment 17% 22% 61% 100%
Social housing 1% 17% 82% 100%
Health 3% 84% 13% 100%
Culture and recreation 8% 32% 60% 100%
Education 9% 60% 31% 100%
Welfare 42% 38% 20% 100%
Source: Swiss Federal Department of Finance
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Table 3: Use of direct democracy institutions, 1990-2010
State Cantons Municipalities*
Initiative 76 354 187
Optional referendum 67 362 337
Mandatory referendum 45 1374 2918
Source: C2D, *Micotti and Bützer (2003)
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Table 4: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Municipal expenditure p/c (Log) 12.78 0.34 11.49 14.66 1782
Mandatory ref. (mun) 0.64 0.47 0 1 1785
Mandatory ref. (can) 0.44 0.49 0 1 1785
Mandatory ref. (mun)*(can) 0.36 0.48 0 1 1785
Population (Log) (mun) 9.77 0.67 8.51 12.79 1785
Share pop foreigner (mun) 0.25 0.08 0.07 0.51 1785
Share pop < 20 (mun) 0.21 0.02 0.15 0.28 1785
Share pop > 64 (mun) 0.16 0.03 0.07 0.24 1785
Area (mun) 0.20 0.27 0.02 2.54 1785
Unemployment (mun) 4.12 2.02 0.2 12.3 1782
University (mun) 0.07 0.26 0 1 1785
Urban center dummy (mun) 0.42 0.49 0 1 1785
Federal tax on income p/c (mun) (Log) 2.13 0.50 0.57 4.70 1785
Left wings parties - cabinet (mun) 0.26 0.17 0 0.8 1782
Ministers (mun) 7.31 3.43 3 30 1782
Parties in Gov (mun) 3.95 0.95 2 8 1782
Cantonal Language (can) 0.28 0.45 0 1 1785
Left wings parties - cabinet (can) 0.27 0.12 0 0.6 1785
Dependency ratio (can) 59.25 16.38 -170.20 73.34 1785
Population (Log) (can) 12.97 0.82 10.54 14.08 1785
Recreational area (mun) 51.28 80.30 5 733 1785
Industrial area (mun) 51.30 46.32 0 259 1785
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Table 5: Model without interaction term for the period 1993-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mandatory ref. (mun) -0.002 0.008 0.002
(0.080) (0.051) (0.046)
Mandatory ref. (can) 0.151** 0.186*** 0.179***
(0.062) (0.051) (0.049)
Population (Log) (mun) -0.028 0.002 -0.014 0.004
(0.044) (0.037) (0.039) (0.034)
Share pop foreigner (mun) 0.350 0.399 0.043 0.078
(0.387) (0.348) (0.332) (0.297)
Share pop < 20 (mun) -3.445* -3.747* -4.295** -4.499**
(1.959) (1.891) (1.740) (1.664)
Share pop > 64 (mun) 0.484 0.526 0.055 0.052
(1.106) (1.145) (1.229) (1.227)
Area (mun) 0.164** 0.140** 0.141** 0.127**
(0.065) (0.054) (0.055) (0.047)
Unemployment (mun) 0.012 0.008 0.026* 0.023*
(0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013)
University (mun) 0.285*** 0.274*** 0.215** 0.213**
(0.083) (0.076) (0.083) (0.079)
Urban center dummy (mun) 0.086 0.081 0.087* 0.083*
(0.057) (0.050) (0.048) (0.043)
Federal tax on income p/c (Log) (mun) 0.213** 0.192** 0.218** 0.204**
(0.089) (0.081) (0.083) (0.075)
Left wings parties - cabinet (mun) -0.203* -0.126
(0.116) (0.109)
Parties in Gov (mun) -0.021 -0.021
(0.025) (0.023)
Ministers (mun) 0.008 0.005
(0.006) (0.006)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cantonal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Basel dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.141 0.493 0.504 0.180 0.547 0.552
N 1782 1782 1780 1782 1782 1780
The dependent variable is the log annual municipal per capita expenditure.
Standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the cantonal level. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 and ***p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Model with interaction term for the period 1993-2007
(1) (2) (3)
Mandatory ref. (mun) 0.025 0.004 0.014
(0.078) (0.053) (0.054)
Mandatory ref. (can) 0.279** 0.292*** 0.299***
(0.108) (0.073) (0.070)
Mandatory ref. (can)*(mun) -0.183 -0.148* -0.174**
(0.129) (0.079) (0.077)
Population (Log) (mun) -0.009 0.017
(0.036) (0.032)
Share pop foreigner (mun) 0.074 0.133
(0.318) (0.278)
Share pop < 20 (mun) -3.934** -4.104**
(1.567) (1.508)
Share pop > 64 (mun) 0.255 0.350
(1.171) (1.171)
Area (mun) 0.151*** 0.133***
(0.052) (0.044)
Unemployment (mun) 0.031** 0.028**
(0.013) (0.013)
University (mun) 0.198** 0.190**
(0.088) (0.084)
Urban center dummy (mun) 0.094* 0.090**
(0.049) (0.043)
Federal tax on income p/c (Log) (mun) 0.226** 0.208***
(0.081) (0.073)
Left wings parties - cabinet (mun) -0.182
(0.107)




Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Cantonal controls Yes Yes Yes
Basel dummy Yes Yes Yes
Signiﬁcance inter + (can)1 * *** ***
Signiﬁcance inter + (mun)2 - - **
R2 0.193 0.555 0.563
N 1782 1782 1780
The dependent variable is the log annual municipal per capita expenditure.
Standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the cantonal level. *p
< 0.1, **p < 0.05 and ***p < 0.01.
1 joint signiﬁcance level of cantonal referendum and interaction
2 joint signiﬁcance level of municipal referendum and interaction
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Table 7: Robustness checks
OLS Spatial OLS Random Eﬀect Fixed Eﬀect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mandatory ref. (mun) 0.014 0.014 -0.008 -0.043
(0.059) (0.046) (0.050) (0.050)
Mandatory ref. (can) 0.299*** 0.299*** 0.109*** 0.080*
(0.052) (0.061) (0.035) (0.040)
Mandatory ref. (can)*(mun) -0.174** -0.174*** -0.103** -0.066
(0.067) (0.070) (0.042) (0.046)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demo-Eco controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cantonal controls Yes Yes Yes No
Basel dummy Yes Yes Yes No
Cantonal FE No No No Yes
R2 0.563 0.563 0.444 0.699
N 1780 1780 1780 1780
The dependent variable is the log annual municipal per capita expenditure.
Standard errors in parenthesis. In column (1) standard errors are clustered at the municipal level. In
column (2) spatial correlated standard errors. Neighborhood distance cutoﬀ of 15 km. In columns (3-4)
standard errors are clustered at the cantonal level. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 and ***p < 0.01.
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Table 8: IV Robustness checks
OLS Fixed Eﬀect Spatial GMM
Mandatory ref. (mun) -0.040 0.013 0.045
(0.052) (0.086) (0.080)
Mandatory ref. (can) 0.254*** 0.121** 0.287***
(0.061) (0.053) (0.086)
Mandatory ref. (can)*(mun) -0.126* -0.199* -0.172*
(0.067) (0.104) (0.106)
Demo-Eco controls Yes Yes Yes
Political controls Yes Yes Yes
Cantonal controls Yes No Yes
Basel dummy Yes No Yes
Cantonal FE No Yes No
Weak instruments test
Shea’s Partial R2 0.108 0.038 0.108
F-statistic 19.11 6.39 13.31
Overidentiﬁcation test
Sargan statistic 2.4678 9.472 2.067
p-value 0.116 0.002 0.350
R2 0.453 0.699 0.463
N 1780 1780 1780
The dependent variable is the log annual municipal per capita expenditure.
Federal tax on income p/c is instrumented using all regressors, plus industrial municipal
area and recreational municipal area as instruments.
Standard errors in parenthesis. In columns (1-2) standard errors are clustered at the
cantonal level. In column (3) spatial correlated standard errors. Neighborhood distance
cutoﬀ of 15 km. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 and ***p < 0.01.
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Ref Can - Ref Mun
Ref Can - Ref Mun / No Ref Mun
Ref Can - No Ref Mun
No Ref Can - Ref Mun
No Ref Can - Ref Mun / No Ref Mun 
No Ref Can - No Ref Mun
Figure 1: Variability of direct democratic institutions in Switzerland.
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A APPENDIX
Table A.1: Data description
Variable Name Description Source
Municipal expenditure p/c
(Log)
Natural logarithm of expenditure net per
capita
Own calculation on the basis of data from
Statistiques des Ville Suisses
Mandatory ref. (mun) Dummy variable = 1, in case mandatory
referendum exist, and zero otherwise (mu-
nicipal)
Bützer (2007)
Mandatory ref. (can) Dummy variable = 1, in case mandatory
expenditure referendum exist, and zero
otherwise (cantonal)
Fischer (2009)
Mandatory ref. (mun)*(can) Mandatory ref. (mun)*Mandatory ref.
(can)
Own calculation
Population (Log) (mun) Natural logarithm of municipality popula-
tion
Own calculation on the basis of data from
Swiss Federal Statistical Oﬃce
Unemployment (mun) Share of unemployment people Statistiques des Ville Suisses
Share pop foreigner (mun) Share of foreigner on municipal population
in 2000
Statistiques des Ville Suisses
Share pop < 20 (mun) Share of people with age < 20 on munici-
pal population in 2000
Statistiques des Ville Suisses
Share pop > 64 (mun) Share of people with age > 64 on munici-
pal population in 2000
Statistiques des Ville Suisses
Area (mun) Municipal surface Swiss Federal Statistical Oﬃce
University (mun) Dummy variable = 1, in case municipality
with university, and zero otherwise
Own calculation
Urban center dummy (mun) Dummy variable = 1, in case municipality
is a urban center, and zero otherwise
Own calculation
Federal tax on income p/c
(Log) (mun)
Average municipal federal tax paid on in-
come. Linear interpolation is used for
missing years.
Statistiques des Ville Suisses
Parties in Gov (mun) Number of parties in cabinet (municipal) Own calculation on the basis of data from
Statistiques des Ville Suisses
Left wings parties - cabinet
(mun)
Share of seat in the cabinet own by a left
party (Socialist, Green and other local left
parties)
Own calculation on the basis of data from
Statistiques des Ville Suisses
Ministers (mun) Number of minister in cabinet (municipal) Own calculation on the basis of data from
Statistiques des Ville Suisses
Population (Log) (mun) Natural logarithm of municipality popula-
tion
Own calculation on the basis of data from
Swiss Federal Statistical Oﬃce
Left wings parties - cabinet
(can)
Share of seat in the cabinet own by a left
party (Socialist, Green and other left par-
ties)
Own calculation on the basis of data from
Swiss Federal Statistical Oﬃce
Dependency ratio (can) (Number of people aged 0-19 and those
aged 65 and over) / (Number of people
aged 20-64)
Own calculation on the basis of data from
Swiss Federal Statistical Oﬃce
Cantonal language (can) Dummy variable = 1, in case the munic-
ipality belong to a non-German speaking
canton
Own calculation
Recreational area (mun) Municipal area devoted to recreational ac-
tivities
Data from Swiss Federal Statistical Oﬃce
Industrial area (mun) Municipal area devoted to industrial ac-
tivities
Data from Swiss Federal Statistical Oﬃce
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Table A.2: First stage regressions
OLS Fixed Eﬀect Spatial GMM
Recreational area (mun) 0.012*** 0.003 0.012***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Industrial area (mun) -0.045*** -0.025*** -0.045***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Demo-Eco controls Yes Yes Yes
Political controls Yes Yes Yes
Cantonal controls Yes No Yes
Basel dummy Yes No Yes
Cantonal FE No Yes No
R2 0.467 0.643 0.467
N 1780 1780 1780
The dependent variable is the log of federal tax on income p/c.
Standard errors in parenthesis. In columns (1-2) standard errors are clustered at
the cantonal level. In column (3) spatial correlated standard errors. Neighborhood
distance cutoﬀ of 15 km. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 and ***p < 0.01.
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